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ABSTRACT
The new era of Internet-based, multi-national communication has
produced myriad of difficulties, difficulties the law has never
encountered before. The difficulties are unique, we feel, because
they often juxtapose popular ancient concepts with new and novel
problems. One such difficulty has to do with the juxtaposition of
the age-old concept of individual privacy with Internet security.
This is the difficult we explore in this Article. Specifically, we
sketch the developing tension between protecting online privacy
and universal online authentication vis-6-vis Microsoft
Corporation's .Net Password architecture. Furthermore, we
highlight areas of research, along the way, that we feel are
amenable to further scholarship.
I. THE RECENT CONTROVERSY OVER MICROSOFT-BASED .NET
PASSPORT'S IMPOSITION UPON ONLINE CONSUMER PRIVACY
1. REAL NEEDS AND REAL PROBLEMS: THE CREATION OF .NET
PASSPORT
The decentralized character of the Internet allows users to post and
collect information anonymously. As a result, the Internet opens
unique opportunities for the promotion of free speech and
expression-that is, the anonymous nature of the Internet allows
individuals and collective entities to convey and express ideas that in
non-anonymous circumstances would perhaps go unuttered. But the
Internet also creates significant challenges. Take, for example, the
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fast-growing number of businesses that choose to provide goods and
services on the worldwide network. From a security perspective, how
will these businesses ("sites") determine whether an online customer
("client") is trustworthy and qualified enough to perform a contract-
based transaction with the site? Before shipment, how will a
Stradivarius supplier in Vienna trust that an order for one of his rare
violins is not from some ten-year-old Californian gone wild with a
stolen credit card? With an eye towards marketing, in what way can
these sites learn more about their unseen clients-about their tastes
and preferences-to provide more attractive goods and services? In
the run-of-the-mill market, merchants see and talk to their clients,
noting subtleties in behavior and implementing marketing strategies
accordingly. Can something analogous to this be achieved on the
Internet?
With these questions in mind, sites are increasingly requiring
clients to provide personal information to facilitate enhanced security
and marketing efficacy. A client's birthday, for example, could
function as a data point with which sites can crosscheck and
corroborate credit card orders. The birthday datum could further serve
as a marketing device, generating effective, age-specific marketing
techniques. In addition to security- and marketing-based concerns,
sites that are interested in creating fast and efficient payment
methods-by drawing clients and online payment devices closer
together-are beginning to require that clients provide personal
information. For example, a site may require that first-time clients
provide both their name and birthday in addition to their credit card
information. Such a scheme would permit returning clients to execute
transactions using their name and birthday only-the sixteen-digit
credit card numeric would no longer be necessary. Hence, client-
specific personal information promotes faster, less-exhausting, and
more client-friendly transactions.
According to the Internet Law and Policy Forum, "authentication
means confirming the identity of a [client]. [Sites]... desire
authentication of [clients] ... [to] promote[ ] [site] comfort that the
transaction is legitimately placed and provides potential recourse in the
event there is a problem."' Authentication is associated with, and
often mistaken for, "identification.' 2  Identification is defined as
1 Internet Law and Policy Forum, The Role of Certification Authorities in Consumer
Transactions, at http://www.ilpf.org/groups/ca/back.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
2 AMETAS, Users Guide:A-H, at http://www.accsis.com/ametas/docsfUsersGuide/glOl.html
(last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
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"using claimed or observed attributes of an individual to infer who the
individual is." 3 Authentication is a process by which clients receive
authorization to perform some online transaction-for example, to
purchase good A. Identification is a process by which clients provide
some personal trait with which a site may be able to recognize them in
the future-for example, a client's birthday.5 Authentication does not
require identification-clients do not have to provide personal
information in order to gain authorization for a transaction, much as
run-of-the-mill customers do not have to provide personal information
to purchase a good at a grocery store.
6
Sites often require new clients to create a username and a
cor responding password. Many require that clients provide
identification, such as name, address, birth date, and so on. Some
gather further information, called profile information, through which
they ascertain client occupations, hobbies, travel preferences, and the
like. Profile information allows a site to improve its marketing regime
and to provide clients with preferred products, the revenues of which
subsidize the site's operation costs.
Authentication systems, even the simplest ones, pose formidable
challenges to both sites and clients. Entering and re-entering variant
information, such as variant usernames and passwords, for different
sites irritates and interrupts the search process. In January 2002,
Jupiter Media Metrix found that the use of variant usernames and
passwords bothered forty-two percent of online customers and that
almost twenty-nine percent of them believed that the customer service
could be improved by developing a simpler web-site sign in process.
8
Entering and re-entering variant information gives rise to another
challenge in authentication systems-Internet users lose or forget
3 Authentication Privacy Principles Working Group, Interim Report: Privacy Principles for
Authentication Systems, at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/authentication/030513interim.pdf (last
visited Oct. 29, 2003).
4 Internet Law and Policy Forum, supra note 1.
5 Authentication Privacy Principles Working Group, supra note 3.
6 AMETAS, supra note 2.
7 id.
8 Microsoft.net Passport, Review Guide, at 3, at http://download.microsoft.com/download/
a/f74/af49b391-086e-4aa2-a84b-ef6d9l6b2f08/passport reviewguide.doc (last visited Mar. 15,
2005) quoting Jupiter Media Metrix, Helping Consumers Understand Security Risks of Online
Registration and Storing Personal Information. Primary Analyst: Rob Leathern.
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passwords, given their number and variation.9 This, along with the
fear of losing future passwords, creates a significant barrier to usage,
resulting in the under-utilization of pre-existing Internet and site
infrastructure. Lost passwords also increase the cost of customer
service.10 Last but not least, the irritation and fear caused by the use of
variant passwords pressure Internet users to use identical usernames
and passwords across different sites, increasing the risk of online
identity theft.
Influenced by these difficulties, Microsoft Corporation
("Microsoft") revolutionized the Internet by developing a universal
sign-in mechanism for multi-site surfing in 1999. The cutting-edge
program, first known as Microsoft Passport and later renamed .NET
Passport, resolved the difficulties in two ways. First, it allowed clients
to enjoy one sign-in portal, with one username and one password, from
which they could access multiple participating sites. Second, it
eliminated the need for individual sites to authenticate or identify
clients, reducing operation costs for participating sites-thus, a
participating site would not have to determine whether a client met the
requirements for buying good A."
The .NET Passport ("Passport") architecture is based on a single
authentication server operated by Microsoft. Passport clients are
assigned unique usemames, called Passport Unique Identifications
(PUIDs), with which they log on to the Passport server. 12
Passport was initially designed to collect a vast array of
information from clients, which could be split up into three
conventional blocks. The first contained minimal information: a
client's username (i.e., a functional e-mail account) and password,
both necessary to log in. The second block, named credentials,
contained information that enabled clients to retrieve lost or forgotten
passwords. For example, in the event of a lost or forgotten password,
Passport prompted a client-chosen secret question. If the client
answered the question correctly, Passport supplied the forgotten
password. The third block, named maximal profile information,
9 Trustgenix, Free Whitepaper: Enabling Single Sign-On Through Identity Federation,
Executive Summary, at http://www.trustgenix.com/whitepaper (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
10 Id.
1 Microsoft.net Passport, Review Guide, at 3, at http://download.microsoft.com/download/a/
f/4/af49b391-086e-4aa2-a84b-ef6d916b2f08/passport reviewguide.doc (last visited Mar. 15,
2005).
121d. at 10.
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contained personal information about clients, such as gender,
birthdate, occupation and the time zone in which the client was
located. This last block was also capable of containing pictures of
clients and their loved ones.
1 3
To promote Passport, Microsoft made access to many of its
popular online services-such as online instant messaging, Hotmail,
and online assistance for Microsoft products-contingent on the
creation of an individual Passport account. In accordance to
Microsoft, by 2003, Passport had over 200 million subscribers
worldwide, 14 performing an astounding 3.5 billion authentications per
month. 15 It included about eighty participating sites. 16  All was going
well for Passport and Microsoft, until a colossal turmoil of criticism
dawned on the horizon.
2. THE VALUE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION IN BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS ON THE INTERNET
For a variety of reasons, cultures that embrace the Internet have
become increasingly conscious of volunteering personal information
on the Internet. The most immediate reason is protection. Like most
human beings, individual clients derive psychological satisfaction
from knowing that their personal information is protected. An
individual's ability to find a good job, secure an affordable mortgage
rate, and obtain preferred healthcare depends on the information
available about that individual in society. When every transaction that
a consumer makes is being compiled, manipulated, analyzed, and
reanalyzed, the chances for mistakes increase. Even if all of the data
collected appears to be accurate, is there a social value in encouraging
creation of comprehensive internet data warehouses managed by
private businesses? As Challis and Cavoucian suggest:
13 In the Matter of Microsoft Corp., Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for
Investigation and for Other Relief, at 7, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/
MScomplaint.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Complaint].
14 Joe Wilcox, Study: Customers Wary of Online IDs, CNET NEWS.COM, $ 21 (Apr. 26, 2002)
at http://news.com.com/2100-1001_3-892808.html (last visited Nov. 21 2004).
15 Microsoft.net Passport, supra note 11, at 3; World LII, EPIC Alert (Jan. 31, 2003), at
http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/EPICAlert/2003/2.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
16 Seppo Heikkinen, Identity Management, at 92, at http://www.cs.uta.fi/reports/bsarja/B-
2004-8.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
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If the totality of every person's online experience is
captured, warehoused, profiled and data-mined, human
behavior can be adversely and ineluctably altered on an
individual and societal basis.... Individuals are manipulated
according to a set of rules or code that lurks somewhere
behind their computer screens, and of which they are only
vaguely aware. 17
Jupiter Media Metrix found that the protection of personal
information on the Internet could cost sites $25 billion by 2006,8
absorbing capital that could otherwise be spent in more efficient ways.
Further, a U.S. Federal State Commission report, released in 2000,
found that ninety-two percent of clients were concerned (and sixty-
seven percent very concerned) about the level of protection, deterring
commercial activity from otherwise taking place. In fact, consumers
who had never made an online purchase identified protection as a key
reason for their inaction. 19 Avivah Litan, a leading Gartner analyst,
has concluded: "[p]eople are paranoid; they don't want to give their
information away and they have a right to be paranoid." 2) Ensuring
protection, therefore, would substantially amplify the quantum of
business activity on the Internet. But this approach is predicated on an
important assumption-namely, that personal information is
indispensable to Internet-based business transactions. Because
Internet-based business transactions require personal information, and
because potential clients tend to bear protection concerns that deter
their participation in these transactions, then ensuring and providing
superior protection mechanisms would, according to this line of
thinking, enhance business.2 1 If, however, personal information were
not a requirement for participation in Internet-based transactions, then
17 William S. Challis & Dr. Ann Cavoukian, The Case for a US. Privacy Commissioner: A
Canadian Commissioner's Perspective, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, *35
(2000).
1s Jupiter Media Metrix, Online Privacy Vision Report, at http://www.jup.com/bin/item.pl/
search/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
19 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace, at 2, (May 2000), at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf
(last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
20 Wilcox, supra note 14.
21 id
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potential clients would not harbor prohibitive protection concerns in
the first place. Enhancing protection, therefore, appears to be just one
way to boost business. Designing a platform through which Internet-
based transactions can take place absent the need for clients' personal
information is another viable route to achieving that end-a route that
seems to be more consonant with Western notions of individual
autonomy.
This begs the question: if online personal information management
is accurate and protected, what social value exists in maintaining data
warehouses managed by sites? Does the procurement of personal
information from clients serve any social value aside from promoting
efficient business on the Internet? And must personal data be obtained
for efficient business on the Internet in the first place?
If anything, the social consequences of maintaining online personal
information are damaging. 22 The bulk of scholarship that deals with
the acquisition of online personal information centers on alleged
violation of individual rights, individual autonomy, and individual
dignity. A potentially fertile avenue of future scholarship is to
examine the extent to which routine collection of personal information
from individuals on the Internet affects aggregate social behavior off
the Internet. If the personal information necessary to participate in
ordinary transactions is volunteered by a subset of the population time
and again, and if the cardinality of that subset is increasing more and
more as members of society begin to participate in Internet-based
transactions, would the importance that a society places on the privacy
of personal information off the Internet eventually diminish? Could
repeated production of individual personal information on the Internet
eventually transform individual and mass-aggregate mentalities so
that, for example, there would come a day when no American would
be upset by having to produce her birth date to obtain a gallon of milk?
The point should be clear: the procurement of personal information on
the Internet lacks any social value outside of promoting efficient
business and, in point of fact, may encourage a diminution in the
premium society places on the privacy of personal information off the
Internet.
22 See Challis & Cavoukian, supra note 17, at *35.
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3. DIFFERING STANDARDS OF PROTECTION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
In an effort to protect the interests of both clients and sites,
governments around the world have developed varying policies
addressing the protection of personal information online
("protection").23
Some claim that the European Union ("EU") is the trendsetter in
addressing protection.24 Under the EU 95/46/EC Data Protection
Directive, all Member States must "protect the fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their ri ght to privacy
with respect to the processing of personal data." 25- Under the
Directive, personal information data ("data") may be collected, stored,
retrieved, or processed under limited circumstances: (a) clients must
unambiguously consent to data collection; (b) the purpose for the
procurement of data must be legitimate; (c) clients must know site
identity and site interest in the data; (d) clients must have ready access
to data that pertains to them; (e) clients must have the ability to object
to the use of any data that pertains to them; and (f) data must not be the
sole basis on which important decisions-including work ability,
26creditworthiness, and reliability-are based. To ensure the
implementation of these principles, the Directive further established
the Working Party, an independent European advisory body on data
protection.
In contrast to the EU, the United States has not passed any
overarching legislation dealing with data protection. Several reasons
may account for this. The U.S. adopted its Constitution centuries
before protection became a concern among industrialized countries.
Given the extensive and time-consuming process by which laws are
made in the U.S., legislation that may significantly affect protection is
23 See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 [hereinafter Directive]; Marsha
Cope Huie et al., The Right to Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods the US. and
Controversy Continues, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 391 (2002).
24 Angela Vitale, The EU Privacy Directive and the Resulting Safe Harbor: The Negative
Effects on U.S. Legislation Concerning Privacy on the Internet, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
321, 322 (2002).
25 Directive, supra note 23, art. 1.
26 Huie, supra note 23, at 445.
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likely to take longer to sanction and implement. In addition, as Joel
Reidenberg observes, the European vision of governance "generally
regards the state as the necessary player to frame the social community
in which individuals develop and in which information practices must
serve individual identity... Indeed, citizens trust government more than
the private sector with personal information .... Law enshrines
prophylactic protection through comprehensive rights and
responsibilities. 2
Enacted laws in both the EU and the U.S. also afford some
guidance in resolving the divergence in scope of legislation between
the two entities. The EU regime stipulates that clients must
unambiguously consent to the collection of personal data.28 Under this
regime, clients opt into a scheme in which they volunteer their
personal information. They hold the freedom to choose whether they
participate in a regime-a regime in which protection is a difficult
issue. By contrast, the U.S. applies an opt out approach, which allows
for the collection of data only if subjects have the option to terminate
the process at will.29 "U.S. privacy laws generally keep intact the
rights of businesses to use personal data for marketing purposes, so
long as they provide the consumer a choice to 'opt out' of
participation-usually by checking a box on the company's Web
site." Whereas the EU legal scheme allows data collection only if
clients initially consent, the U.S. scheme allows it only if the clients
have the ability to opt out. This difference reflects a divergence of
values between personal data protection and commercial data
protection in the two cultures. 3 1 Kramer explains the divergence as
follows: while Europeans treat privacy as a fundamental human right,
Americans view it as a commodity that should be controlled through
the free market. In the European mindset, personal information is
closely connected with individual integrity and autonomy, so much so
that to give it away is akin to giving up one's bodily organs. In the
27 Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 Hous. L. REv. 717, 730-
31(2001).
28 Directive, supra note 23, art. 1.
29 Seagrumn Smith, Microsoft and the European Union Face Off Over Internet Privacy
Concerns, 2002 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 14.
3 0 Jon Swartz & Byron Acohido, EU Scrutinizes Microsoft's Passport, USA TODAY, June 12,
2002, at 3B.
31 See generally Lynn Chuang Kramer, Private Eyes Are Watching You: Consumer Online
Privacy Protection-Lessonsfrom Home andAbroad, 37 TEx. INT'L L.J. 387 (2002).
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commodity-driven mindset of Americans, personal information is yet
another good in the free marketplace, a good that an individual may
elect to barter away.
32
Thus, instead of an overarching regime as in Europe, the U.S. has
adopted a series of discrete mechanisms designed to protect data that
fall within some narrowly-drawn category of sensitive data-for
example, medical (HIPAA), financial (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) and
children's (COPPA) records that contain personal information.
"Sectoral" categories such as these are afforded protection. Further,
whereas the EU has created the Working Party, the U.S. has not
created a special authoritative body on data protection. The U.S.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) acts on behalf of consumer
protection complaints, but its "authority is restricted to a deceptive or
unfair practice, which causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or competition.
'
"
33
In spite of such sweeping differences between these two
approaches, which give rise to heated debates among players from
both sides of the Atlantic, the Passport case delivered a surprising
result: both the EU and U.S. policies on protection supported and
complemented one another. When brought together, the bi-partite legal
scheme produced a sensible victory for privacy advocates worldwide.
4. WHY THE CLASH WITH PASSPORT?
Passport's implementation brought forth unprecedented turmoil
among privacy advocates in Europe and the U.S. From the outset,
Microsoft faced two distinct challenges: 1) the software behind
Passport did not afford sufficient protection, and 2) Microsoft
company34 policies allegedly disregarded consumer privacy and
security.
On the first count, Passport was scrutinized on three distinct
grounds: (a) Passport could collect vast arrays of general profiling
information with no legitimate reason in sight; (b) the designation of
PUIDs to clients and the collection of data in a central repository
provided Microsoft with the ability to process client information
32 Id. at 390.
33 Challis & Cavoukian, supra note 17, at *24.
34 Complaint, supra note 13.
[Vol. 1:2-3
DMYTRENKO & NARDALI
unilaterally without notice and consent; (c) Passport lacked adequate
security standards especially when it was employed from public
computer portals.3
On the second count, Microsoft was scrutinized on three distinct
grounds: (a) access to other Microsoft services, such as software
support, was contingent upon Passport registration; (b) Microsoft
ensured clients a high level of protection on its participating sites,
when it merely required those sites to have a privacy policy and did
not provide any baseline standards; (c) Microsoft possessed the ability
to introduce fees for Passport services, such as access to clients'
personal information, allowing financially-disadvantaged clients
limited control over their own data.3
6
Convincing the EU and the U.S. to initiate an investigation based
on these accusations was difficult, as neither had in place a mechanism
for adjudication on the merits.
5. THE CONTROVERSY AND THE U.S.
The FTC, the sole agency capable of reviewing business-based
protection complaints in the United States, does not assign a specific
definition, value, or remedy to protection compromises per se; the
FTC merely provides remedies against "unfair and deceptive trade
practice[s]."3 The analysis of the Federal Trade Commission Act38
shows that, in fact, to obtain relief measures from the FTC, a
complainant concerned of a privacy violation must show the
following: (a) that a site imposed on client privacy; (b) that doing so
caused (or could cause) a particular injury; (c) that the injury is (or
could be) greater than the interest in a self-regulated and unrestricted
market. If unmet, the FTC would side with the site; the American right
to business self-regulation would triumph over the consumer right to
protection of personal information.
Given this burden against the client, privacy advocates in the
U.S.-the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and twelve
other leading consumer protection groups-filed a complaint with the
FTC in July 2001, hoping for fragmentary relief at best; namely, to
35 Id.
36 id.
37 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2005).
38 id.
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enjoin Microsoft from alleged misrepresentations in marketing
Passport to clients.39 The privacy groups argued that profiling clients
amounted to "unfair and deceptive practice '  and requested the FTC
to enjoin Microsoft from violating §5 of the FTC Act, which refers to
unfair and deceptive trade practices. In other words, the FTC did not
predicate its case upon a violation of the privacy afforded to personal
information-which some would consider a basic and fundamental
human right. Because the FTC has jurisdiction in allegations of unfair
and deceptive practice, this was the only viable way to initiate the
battle.
6. THE CONTROVERSY AND THE EU
In contrast to the U.S., privacy complaints within the EU are
adjudicated by determining whether the site violated a fundamental
value in protection.41 For sites that have been found to violate privacy
regulations, the consequences can be heavy-when EU Commissioner
Erik Meijer convinced EU authorities to investigate Passport
allegations in May 2002, optimistic journalists reported: "[i]f
Microsoft is found to have violated EU privacy rules, it could face
fines and be ordered to squelch any offendinj activities. The EU also
could order Passport pulled from the market." 2
The legal issues involved in the EU investigation were much more
complicated in structure than those portrayed by the media. Microsoft
was not a EU-based company, and so its business practices could, at
best, fall under the EU jurisdiction only as much as they affected the
EU market. The worldwide availability of the Passport naturally
triggered a question of the EU's ability to determine the Passport's fate
for the EU consumers without affecting the interests of consumers
outside the Union. Another difficulty was determining the
authoritative entity that would handle the case: would it be a
communal EU body or a member-state agency in charge of dealing
with protection? A communal body-here, the Working Party-
would lack any and all power of direct enforcement: as a European
Commission spokesman once explained, "while the [collective]
39 Complaint, supra note 13.
40 Complaint, supra note 13.
41 See generally Directive, supra note 23.
42 Swartz & Acohido, supra note 30.
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Commission has authority to help member states interpret European
Community law, it lacks authority to investigate on its own. ' 43 The
Data Protection Directive, which outlined the Working Party's primary
legal framework, was intended to help member states implement
nation-specific legislation; it was not designed as a statute that
explicitly outlined sanctions for violations, let alone sanctions for
violations by entities outside the EU's physical borders. The only
courses of action available to the Working Party were written
documents-a recommendation, an expert opinion, or, most potent, a
report to the Commission that would invite it to take action if it
thought action were necessary. That said, handing the matter to the
Working Party would "produce one European answer," in both a cost
and time-efficient manner.44 Though a seemingly feeble declaration
on its own, the Working Party statement would come from a unified
and cohesive European body.
7. MICROSOFT's REPLY TO BOTH THE EU AND THE U.S.
Microsoft initially denied all of the accusations outlined in the
EPIC request to the FTC, declaring that EPIC's attack against
Microsoft's efforts to provide consumers with a uniform method of
doing business was intended to use "the trappings of a legal procedure
to generate press attention for their own agendas and their own
philosophical opposition to the technology itself, in whatever form it
might be implemented. ''45 Effectively using the limitations intrinsic to
both the Working Party and the FTC, Microsoft dismembered privacy
imposition into narrow and discrete structures, none of which could
possibly be found illegal on its own. Microsoft argued to the FTC, for
example, that the inability of clients to delete their Passport profiles
complied with U.S. law: there was no law requiring that clients be able
to delete their accounts.46 Microsoft had never claimed, the company
43EU Countries May Consider Microsoft Data Probe, MERCURY NEWS.COM, May
27, 2002, available at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/business/
international/europe/3347830.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp (last
visited Mar. 17, 2005).
44Id.
45 Microsoft, Microsoft Privacy Priorities and Practices with Respect to the EPIC Complaint
to the FTC: Facts and Clarifications, at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2001/
aug01/0824PrioritiesFS.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
4Id.
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further argued, that clients could delete their Passport accounts. 47
Therefore, no "deception" existed. Microsoft additionally argued that
the complainants failed to substantiate general allegations with specific
examples: despite the subscription of millions of clients and the
computation of billions of authentications on Passport, the
complainants could not cite a single instance in which data was
endangered.48
Microsoft initially reacted to EPIC's complaint aggressively
stating that the complaint was "replete with factual errors,
misrepresentations and speculations that demonstrate[d] fundamental
misunderstandings of the products, services and technologies they
challenge[d]" and was filed "solely on the basis that EPIC disagrees
with or is dissatisfied with private-sector efforts to protect consumer
privacy." 49  Nevertheless, the company eventually implemented
changes to Passport that comported with EPIC's complaint and,
thereby, gave a prima fqcie impression of deference to both the FTC
and the Working Party.
In spite of this appearance, there remains a question as to whether
in fact deference and complaisance had anything to do with the matter.
According to Adam Sohn, the Microsoft product manager for Passport
implementation, the modifications that followed the Microsoft
settlement with the FTC were already in the works: the modifications
had very little, if anything, to do with the FTC complaint. "[The]
process [of change] started a year ago.. .It's a regular update to the
service .... This is all stuff that's been in the works for some time." 51
Richard Smith, an independent security analyst, agrees: "Microsoft is
just trying to clean up stuff...They're fixing some problems here in
what is a natural evolution of Passport., 52
4 7 
Id.
48 id.
49 id.
50 See generally In the Matter of Microsoft Corp., Agreement Containing Consent Order, File
No. 012 2340, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/O8/raicrosoftagree.pdf (last visited Nov. 30,
2003) [hereinafter Agreement].
"' Microsoft Beefs Up Passport Security, CNET News.com (Sept. 2, 2002), at http://ecoustics-
cnet.com.com/Microsoft+beefs+up+Passport+security/2100-1001_3-956246.html (last visited
Dec. 14, 2004).
52 Id.
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According to the above accounts, the modifications were already in
the works; they would have been carried out with or without the EPIC-
initiated complaint. If truthful, Sohn and Smith's comments prove a
nasty setback for EPIC, the FTC, and the Working Party, who received
much praise for their ostensible ability and power to effectuate such
change. Evidence indicates, however, that Sohn and Smith provided at
least a somewhat misleading account of the matter. If, as Microsoft
strongly asserted at first, their behavior was not prohibited by the letter
of the law, and if, as Sohn and Smith suggest, company modifications
intended to repair objectionable-albeit legal-privacy matters were
already in the works, why did the parties settle?
Brad Smith, Microsoft's general counsel, is on the record as stating
that Microsoft believed that "...the agreement with the FTC would
raise [the bar for Internet security and privacy] not only for Microsoft,
but for the industry as a whole. .. ,,53 "We realize - he continued, that
some of our statements in the past could have been clearer and in some
cases less enthusiastic. We've already changed them..." 54  This
evidence suggests that Microsoft was in fact influenced by outside
developments in a tangible way.
Even if Microsoft did not violate the law de jure, continued
investigation into alleged violations of privacy rights would prove a
public nightmare. The FTC's influence is supported by the fact that
the settlement agreement stipulates that Microsoft will be levied
$11,000 per violation per day for breaking any of its terms. Recall
that by 2003 there were roughly 200 million subscribers on Passport.
Using that figure, a Passport-wide security breach would cause
Microsoft $2,750,000,000,000 per day-not a small order even for
Microsoft. The quantum of power legal agencies yielded in
transforming Microsoft's behavior remains a genuine question
amenable to further scholarship.
The settlement agreements are outlined in four sets of documents:
(a) the Agreement between Microsoft and the FTC; (b) an FTC
Consent Order; (c) Working Document on Online Authentication
Systems by the Working Party; and (d) Microsoft's new privacy policy
on Passport utilization.
53 Brad Smith, Q&A: Microsoft's Agreement with the Federal Trade Commission on Passport
(Aug. 8, 2002) at http://www.nicrosoft.com/presspass/features/2002/augO2/08-O8passport.asp
(last visited May 16, 2005).
54 Id.
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8. MICROSOFT'S AGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S.
Under its settlement with the FTC, Microsoft agreed "not [to]
misrepresent in any manner, expressly or by implication, its
information practices" and to disclose sample reproductions of its
marketing scheme to the FTC upon request.5 It further promised to
"establish and maintain a comprehensive information security
program... designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and
integrity of information collected from or about [clients]. ' ' 56 Backed
by the Consent Order, the settlement stipulated that Microsoft undergo
an independent audit and report any measures taken as a result to the
FTC. Failure to follow the Consent Order would constitute a violation
of the law and would entail civil penalties. 57
9. MICROSOFT'S AGREEMENTS WITH THE EU
Due to the jurisdictional limitations, the Working Party in its
capacity of an advisory body, could not afford an introduction of a
strong enforcement mechanism or a penalty comparable to the FTC's
$11,000 per day per violation.. On the other hand, it could afford, in
contrast to the FTC, responding to a general privacy concern directly
instead of tailoring the logic of the response to a concept of "deceptive
trade practices." The analysis of the Working Document shows that
the obligations it imposes on Microsoft form three logical clusters: (1)
to provide users with more control regarding their own data; (2) to
streamline communication to users regarding their privacy protection;
and (3). to take efforts towards developing a more privacy-friendly
technical architecture for the Passport.
To provide clients with more control over their data, the Working
Document suggested the following: that clients have the capability to
create pseudonymous accounts; that clients have the ability to delete
Passport accounts with ease; that clients have the ability to omit data
from their Passport profiles; and that clients have the ability to revise
personal data with ease.
5 Agreement, supra note 50, at 3.
56 1d. at4.
57Id. at 2.
58 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on On-line Authentication
Services, 15 (Jan. 29, 2003), at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/privacy/docs/
wpdocs/2003/wp68_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Article 29].
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To streamline the communication of Passport-related regulations to
clients, the Working Document also suggested the following: that
Microsoft make clear that subscription to a Hotmail account would
allow the exploitation of personal data to generate client-specific
advertisements; that Microsoft make manifestly clear that it has no
control over the privacy policies of participating sites; and that
Microsoft provide special protection to EU Passport subscribers by
notifyin 9 clients of relevant EU protection law when registering an
account.
Finally, to research potential technical solutions to the protection
issues presented by Passport, the Working Document suggested that
Microsoft "explore alternative architecture for .NET Passport" that
would avoid assigning users unique identifiers (PUIDS), and separate
account formation from storage of personal data in a profile, allowing
for a new field by field flow of the information between the
participating sites, and thus avoiding collection of excessive profile
data.6T
10. A MICROSOFT-MODIFIED POLICY ON PASSPORT
An indication of Microsoft's obligation to improve Passport, the
fourth document to come out of the settlement agreements-
Microsoft's new privacy policy on Passport utilization--established a
higher standard of protection than had ever been expected by the
Working Party. The modified Passport privacy policy reads:
[participating sites] can use Passport profile information only
to deliver the products and services requested by users.
[Participating sites] cannot use Passport profile information
to contact users for any purpose without obtaining the user's
prior consent... cannot assign, transfer, share, transmit, or
publicly disclose Passport profile information---or any
identifiable information gathered from Passport profile-to
any third party without the [client's] consent.
'
9 Id. at 6-7.
60 Id. at 8-10.
61 Review Guide, supra note 11, at 19.
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II. .NET PASSPORT LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL ONLINE
AUTHENTICATION
For several reasons, the Passport controversy is a significant
landmark for online authentication architectures worldwide. The
provisions of the Working Document appear to have impacted
Microsoft clients worldwide-regardless of protection practices in
their own countries. Even more amazing, in addition to avowedly
following Party-specified privacy standards, Microsoft's modified
privacy policy expanded on Party recommendations and further
established privacy-promoting rules to which participating sites
worldwide must now adhere. And note the irony: when all is said
and done, Microsoft, which at the outset had aggressively defied the
EU's self-asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction, has introduced and
implemented modifications that benefit clients worldwide-manifestly
beyond the borders of Europe.
1. Is THERE A GENUINE REASON FOR UNIVERSAL SINGLE-SIGN-IN
ONLINE AUTHENTICATION?
In their investigation, neither the Working Party nor the FTC
evaluated the value of a single sign-on system per se. We noted above
the many difficulties for which Passport was intended to be a solution.
We then summarized-albeit briefly-the program's basic structure
and features. From there, we outlined the argument advanced by
various different organizations-led by EPIC-that these features
violated cardinal privacy rights articulated in the letter of the law. In
formulating an offensive, the organizations filed complaint petitions
with the Working Party and the FTC, requesting that they halt distinct
features and elements of Passport that allegedly ran counter to privacy
rights. From then on, neither the FTC nor the EU ever thought to call
into question the need for a universal single-sign in mechanism. Is
there a genuine need for Passport-esque devices on the Internet? That
is, could the difficulties that Passport was intended to solve be
amended by other, presumptively more privacy-consonant,
mechanisms? Even if the reply is an emphatic "no," so that Passport is
the only viable solution in the market, did the difficulties truly merit a
privacy-speculative and high-risk venture such as Passport? A
balancing-test analysis was never performed. Why? What would be
62 See id. (no distinctions between the privacy policies for EU and non-EU countries are
observed).
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the outcome? These are all questions amenable to further scholarship
on the subject. Consonant with the previous line of questions, some
privacy advocates feel that the Passport approach to authentication
should be condemned, not improved.
In collaboration with various NGOs and websites, the Center for
Democracy and Technology (CDT) has created what are called the
Privacy Principles for Authentication Systems.63  A key principle
proposed by the group concerns the diversity of services and suggests
that clients should have a choice about which authentication
mechanism and providers to use, effectively opposing Microsoft's
desire to create a universal, catch-all sign-on service. EPIC, the
leader in anti-Passport investigation in the U.S., agrees: although the
modifications undertaken by Microsoft were "a step in the right
direction," EPIC feels that the underlying issues have been
neglected. 65 Additionally, EPIC contends that less risk is involved
when clients store passwords in encrypted files on their personal
computers-an alternative solution to the difficulties for which
Passport was initially created. Lastly and somewhat ironically, EPIC
believes that cutting-edge authentication system technology, such as
Passport, "moves us backwards hundreds of years to barter-style sale
arrangements where information is necessary to complete a sale."
66
Personal information is not necessary to purchase milk at the local
food market. The Internet marketplace does not have to be any
different.
2. PARTICIPANT SITE DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PASSPORT OUTCOME
Participant sites ("participants") also appear to be dissatisfied with
the Passport case and its outcome. Without any knowledge of what
Microsoft planned to do with previously-stored data on which they
relied for business, participants were forced by the Passport case to
halt site development and expansion until the settlements were
63 Authentication Privacy Principles Working Group, supra note 3.
64 Id
65 EPIC, FAQ on Microsoft Passport and Windows XP, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/
consumer/microsoft/#faq (last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
66 EPIC, Project Liberty, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/authentication/projectliberty.html
(last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
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concluded.67 Second, EU restrictions left questionable incentive for
participants to remain invested in Passport: in addition to a Microsoft
licensing fee, European participants in the post-settlement era must
conform to higher and more costly privacy standards. 68 Because the
post-settlement Passport architecture allows the creation of multiple
accounts for one client, the incidence of forgotten usernames and
passwords has increased-a crucial problem for which Passport was
founded in the first place. The ability to create multiple accounts has
further decreased any marketing reliability Microsoft may have been
able to provide to participating sites. Bashing the modified Passport
scheme, Hal Stem of Sun Microsystems, a rival of Microsoft, joked:
"If I sign up to Hotmail, forget my password and sign in again, I am
suddenly two people according to Microsoft.
69
In the post-settlement era, there remain crucial and meaningful
questions as to whether the FTC and the EU Working Party actually
brought about the modifications introduced to Passport. From
beginning to end, neither agency ever thought to call into question the
need for a universal single-sign in mechanism in the first place-
whether a legitimate need for Passport-type devices on the Internet
ever existed. That is to say, key underlying and rudimentary questions
went unasked and unresolved. And now, in the post-settlement era,
participant sites no longer see a reason to invest in Passport. Do the
settlements provide any reason to celebrate?
Note that in 2002, research confirmed that the single sign-on
authentication technology was no longer booming-a Gartner study
estimated that there were 50 million registered authentication users (in
contrast to the coinciding 250 million figure quoted by Microsoft).7 °
By 2003, the study continued, the majority of those 50 million users
would visit about three sites a month using the single sign-on service. 7 1
Were the Passport scheme completely disfavored, the market
would fall back into the initial difficulties presented at the beginning:
67 VNU Business Publications, EU Ruling Alters Passport, Feb. 3, 2003, at
http://www.infomaticsonline.co.uk/news/1138435 (last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
68 id,
69 Jeanne-Vida Douglas, Sun Responds to Mundie's Liberty Slur, TECH UPDATE, Mar. 15,
2002, at http://techupdate.zdnet.com/techupdate/stories/main/0, 14179,2855454,00.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2004).
70 Wilcox, supra note 14.
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sites want efficient authentication mechanisms and clients disfavor
variant passwords. Perhaps this situation would yield a serious
discussion about the one underlying question we feel has been
neglected: what other ways are there to fix these difficulties? Sadly,
we are not very optimistic: following Passport's lead, others have
begun to incorporate the single sign-on scheme. The most notable of
these is the "Liberty Alliance Project," launched in December 2001 as
72
a contract-based group. Comprised of more than 100 companies,
non-profit organizations and governments worldwide, the Project's
mission is to simplify sign-on through a "federated network
identity. '73  In its investigation of Passport, the Working Party
examined the Project and its development, concluding that it was
neutral with respect to data protection.74 For privacy advocates, the
Project is far superior to Passport, mainly because the Project uses
what are known as pair-wise identities-and not PUIDs-for each
client.7 5 The Project uses a username and password, but allows client
data to be shared on a maximum of two sites.76 Unlike Passport, the
Project does not centralize client data; rather, client data is collected
and stored by individual participatin sites.77 A user may federate his
account to two service providers. Account federation is used to
enable users to link or terminate accounts.
79
The Project is in its preliminary stages, and it is too early to assess
its impact on the online community.
3. THE FUTURE OF ONLINE AUTHENTICATION IN GENERAL
As the authentication systems penetrate more and more into the
heart of the internet community, it is important to ensure that these
applications are designed to meet the basic data protection interests. It
72 Article 29, supra note 58, at 11-13.
73 Id. at 11-12.
74 1d. at 12.
75 Id. at 12-14.
76 Id
77 Article 29, supra note 58, at 12-14.
71 Id. at 4.
79 Id. at n.13.
2005]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
is important, therefore, to ensure that these systems meet some
baseline standard of protection. The recommendations of the Working
Party's Working Document can provide authoritative guidance in
establishing such baseline standards. Thus, the authentication tools
should aim to (a) hold the individual sites responsible for their data
processing practices; (b) establish clear-cut and explicit contractual
obligations between authentication providers and participants; (c)
ensure minimal collection of client information; (d) to the greatest
extent possible, provide clients with a possibility to employ
anonymous or pseudonymous authentication; (e) facilitate the
provision of full disclosure by the sites of their data protection
practices to their clients; (f) employ minimum centralization in storing
data; (g) allow clients maximum control over their data, including a
possibility to modify and delete the same; and (h) ensure readily
available procedures for handling client inquiries and complaints.
80
The key issue in developing a protection-friendly authentication
scheme is that authentication should not be equalized with
identification-that is to say, there must be a way to authorize and
authenticate site-client transactions without demanding a client's
personal information. The EU Working Party Working Document
reads: "[t]he use of identifiers, whatever form they take, entails data
protection risks. Full consideration should be given to all possible
alternatives."
81
EPIC builds on this idea: in the best-case scenario, it argues that
authentication should be anonymous. Again, optimal authentication
would be similar to run-of-the-mill cash transactions; aside from the
cash itself, no other credentials should be necessary to complete a
transaction. In cases where anonymity is not an option, clients should
be able to choose what personal attribute to provide for authentication.
In that case, authentication involves selective disclosure of client
information for verification - client identity is not disclosed.82
The online merchants should benefit from non-identifying
authentication schemes, where such schemes are applicable, along
with the privacy advocates. In the online community, where less than
ten percent of customers are willing to exchange personal information
8 1ld. at 14-15.
8 Id. at 15.
82 Privacy International, Privacy and Human Rights 2003: Threats to Privacy, at
http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/hr2003/threats.htm (last visited Dec.
14, 2004).
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in order to use personalized site services, 83 it is highly questionable
whether the merchants' investments into deployment and maintenance
of identification-based authentication tools would be able to yield
adequate returns. Client identification should be required only when it
is absolutely necessary, and research should be geared towards
achieving that end.
4. THE IMPACT OF CROSS-BORDER COMMUNICATION ON THE FUTURE
OF AUTHENTICATION
When creating a law of authentication systems, the formulation of
the fundamentals-principles, concepts, and philosophies-on which
that law is grounded are important. Equally important are the external
factors outside of the law, which affect it regardless of these
fundamentals. One can imagine a set of free-standing, internally-
coherent, and logical principles as the founding layer of a law of
authentication systems. The external factors, whether they are logical
or unreasonable, coherent or messy, have to be taken into
consideration. A case in point is Passport. The several investigations
surrounding Passport gave rise to a discussion about fundamental
principles, concepts, and philosophies--data decentralization,
anonymity maximization, and market diversity-that had to comport
with unavoidable external factors, such as the EU and U.S. legal
orders, with which they were interacting. The international scope in
which some laws operate, as in the Passport case, are of extreme
importance and yield interesting consequences.
In the Passport case, the redevelopment of an American-produced
product-Passport-anchored on EU law. Of the many changes
implemented by Microsoft, only one was intended for the Europeans
specifically: namely, the required creation of a prompt box that would
"provide adequate information to the users concerning the data
protection implications of the system." 84  The many remaining
modifications, though suggested by the EU Working Party's Working
Document, were directed at the whole world. Similarly, though the
Working Party did not require that Microsoft dictate a privacy policy
to participant sites, the modified Passport privacy policy requires that
participating sites abide by EU-based principles.
83 Wilcox, supra note 14.
84 Article 29, supra note 58, at 15.
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It is fascinating that an EU-dictated document written explicitly for
the protection of its member states could have so monumental an
impact on the rest of the world. As Mike Pullen, a data protection
lawyer, remarked to the press: "'[t]here has been the opinion [in the
US] that data protection in Europe does not have to be taken seriously
- but now companies are paying attention."' 85  An interesting
consequence of the Passport case, which may appear in other
circumstances in the future, is that when dealing with different regimes
in the international arena, the regime that calls for the most rigorous
modification-here, the EU-often affects authorities and peoples
beyond its borders for economic reasons. This is because the involved
party (like Microsoft) may either process all business transactions in a
way that reflects the stringent approach (here the EU protection
approach) or otherwise bear the extra cost of developing a subsidiary
business model designed specifically for EU-related transactions.
But not everyone in the U.S. shares Pullen's excitement when it
comes to the ubiquity of European protection law: "[t]he Directive in
effect forces the United States. along with all other non-EU countries,
to abide by its regulations...."6 Evidence indicates that both the EU
and the U.S. contributed to reshaping one another's laws, and that
protection law has not expanded in one way only. The commodity
approach embraced by the U.S. has penetrated into the EU. The
Working Party did not ask Microsoft to terminate its direction of
unsolicited advertisements to its Hotmail users. The Working Party
felt and agreed that advertisements were a part of the business model,
from which Microsoft was able to pull profits and provide the service
free-of-charge.
87
85 David Neal, EU Clamps Down on Passport, VNU Business Publications, Feb. 10, 2003, at
http://www.cm.vnunet.com/analysis/1 138643 (last accessed Nov. 24, 2004).
86 Julia M, Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
461, 474 (2000).
87 Article 29, supra note 58, at 7.
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5. CHALLENGES AND VALUES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN
QUEST OF THE "GOLDEN BALANCE" BETWEEN COMPETING INTERESTS
OF INTERNET USERS
In addressing Internet controversies, nations have two options.
They may cooperate and collaborate---even in light of vast
jurisprudential differences. Alternatively, they can implement
conflicting laws, effectively creating more controversies without
resolving the ones that have come before them. Fortunately, the
Passport case exemplified and reinforced the idea of international
cooperation; the Working Party and the FTC complemented one
another's investigations and findings. The FTC voiced no objections
to modified Passport policies brought forth by the EU. Moreover,
though concerned about the security of the software behind Passport,
the Working Party imposed no special security enhancement
requirements on Microsoft, trusting "that Microsoft [would] put in
place an Information Security Program in the framework of the
Consent Order issued" by the FTC.88  EU Internal Market
commissioner Fritz Bolkestein expressed strong confidence in his
collaboration with the FTC, stating:
The Commission has regular contacts with the FTC on a
wide range of issues .... The Commission agrees that the FTC
resolution is indeed an important step in the right direction.
Although the FTC operates in a different legal framework
than the one existing in Europe, the Commission has a
positive opinion of the effectiveness of its enforcement
actions.89
Further evidence of cooperation-induced success is that the
Working Party's findings on Passport were mere persuasive
authority-and at most international "soft law." The language that the
Working Document incorporated lacked force and executive
authority-it used "shall" instead of "should," and phrases such as
"would be appreciated and encouraged." No enforcement mechanism
88 Article 29, supra note 58, at 11.
89 Written Question E-2439/02 of Erik Meijer, 2003 OJ (C 28 E) 0239-0241 (Aug. 28, 2002),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/ce028/
ce02820030206en02390241.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
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was attached to non-compliance, save for a vague promise to continue
monitoring Passport's deployment. Even the title of the Document-
the Working Document-suggested powerlessness and a lack of
binding demands; it is not an "Order," a "Judgment," or even an
"Instruction." Thus there is reason to believe that the outcome of the
case may have differed were it not for the FTC's enforcement powers.
The Working Party had two choices: it could demand sanctions
from the Commission assigned to address Passport's problems, or sit
idle and pray that Microsoft would abide by its provisions voluntarily.
Though formally irrelevant to the enforcement of the Working Party's
resolution, the FTC's participation created pressure on Microsoft to do
its best in improving Passport. In contrast to the powerless language
of the Working Document, the FTC's Consent Order is demanding and
explicit. It provides concrete "shall" obligations. In lieu of a vague
promise to "monitor" the issue should its recommendations not be
followed, the Order unambiguously demands that Microsoft disclose
and report relevant information to authorities, with a risk of penalty for
failure to do so. One must not forget, however, that the scope of the
FTC Order was restricted to addressing only deceptive
misrepresentation practices. It did not intend to formulate universal
standards for the authentication system industry, as had the Working
Document.
In assessing the interaction between EU protection authorities and
the FTC, Microsoft Senior Vice-President and General Counsel Brad
Smith concluded:
Consistent with our heightened security obligations, we
accept responsibility for the past and will focus on living up
to this high level of responsibility in the future .... Industry
and government will be most successful in promoting and
protecting online security and privacy if these efforts are
grounded in dialog and cooperation."
III. CONCLUSION
At present, the proliferation of online authentication systems
counter commonly-held ideas of privacy with respect to personal
90 Microsoft, Q & A: Microsoft's Agreement with the Federal Trade Commission on Passport,
at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2002/augO2/08-O8passport.asp (last visited
Nov. 22, 2004).
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information. Given the international nature of the Internet, finding a
balance between the value we place on authentication and the value we
place on protection must accomplish two feats at once: achieving
universal compatibility and appealing to the various legal frameworks
(and the philosophies from which they arise) in the world. Though
harmonization, maybe even unification, of internet law on an
international level is unlikely to take place any time soon, the Internet
naturally prompts international cooperation and collaboration between
governments in resolving issues that arise-such as the Passport case.
For the foregoing reasons, and in light of the Passport case, future
developers of authentication systems should adhere to the following
guiding principles: 1) separate authentication from identification by
providing anonymous authentication when possible; 2) minimize the
collection of personal data; 3) minimize the centralization of data
storage; and 4) maximize client control over corresponding data. To
make sure that no existing authentication system usurps too much
power over client data, it is vitally important that governments
encourage and promote competition in the authentication system
industry. As Passport developers have put it, "[m]aking computing
safer and more trustworthy is a continuing challenge because
consumers want both privacy and convenience - and those values can
easily conflict." 9' Placed in the context of international relations, the
task becomes even more difficult. But finding a mechanism that meets
both demands-protection and convenience-in the international
arena is the only way in which sites will be able to retain and expand
their client bases. The "net" in "Internet" should not come from
"trapping" personal information, but from offering the advantages of
informed and secure "networking."
91 Microsoft, Q&A: Microsoft Passport Protects Consumer Privacy, at
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/Features/2001/Aug01/08-12passport.asp (last visited on
Aug. 12, 2001).
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